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1 Introduction
In a recent paper in this journal, Mantzavinos (2010) discussed the relation between
federalism and individual liberty. Federalism leads to greater diversity among
political units. Between this diversity and individual liberty he presumed two
relations. (a) Greater diversity enhances individual liberty insofar as it increases the
choice set of the citizens. (b) Greater diversity reduces individual liberty insofar as it
increases exit costs. Thus, he arrives at an optimal degree of federalism. Both of
these relations, but their combination in a common model in particular, have to be
questioned. His first relation is in the dimension of rights, the second one, however,
in the dimension of costs and benefits and to compare them causes problems.
Moreover, his first relation is correct whenever we evaluate individual liberty in the
dimension of rights, but not necessarily in the dimension of individual benefits. His
second relation neglects the most important part of exit costs which usually decrease
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with greater liberty. Thus, the opposite relation between diversity and exit costs
seems to be more plausible. In the following, these points are discussed.
2 Rights versus benefits
In his famous paper about the liberal paradox Sen (1970) shows that the introduction
of individual liberal rights can lead to a Pareto suboptimal situation. In our situation,
something similar can happen: An increase in individual liberty might reduce the
benefit of some individuals.
If we stick to the dimension of individual rights, we might accept that greater diversity
among political units goes along with greater individual liberty (or does at least not
reduce it), because it increases the choice set, even if the additional elements in the
choice set are clearly dominated by the already existing ones. In this perception, only the
number of elements in the choice set counts, irrespective of the utility I gain if I choose
one of these elements. To state it differently, preference intensities do not play a role in
such a perspective once we consider rights. As Hausman and McPherson (1993,
pp. 693ff.) mention, many (economists) believe in such a Kantian perspective, i.e. that
liberty rights are intrinsically valuable and should not be traded against aspects of well-
being. Such arguments dispense with consequentialism, the usual philosophy behind
economic reasoning, and take on a deontological instead of a teleological perspective.1
Nevertheless, in our everyday life we weight quite often individual liberties
against aspects of well-being, individually as well as politically. Moreover, there are
only very few moral dilemma situations where our common moral conviction
prohibits the evaluation of costs and benefits of an action as, for example, in the case
of torture. Thus, it is totally acceptable to consider the problem of individual liberty
in the case of federalism from a welfarist point of view.2 The analytical approach to
analyze the relationship of federalism and liberty chosen by Mantzavinos (2010)
builds on a direct individual welfare component in his concept of liberty. He states
that with increasing diversity an individual has more options to choose a policy
bundle according to his preferences (‘‘desires’’). Hence, the ‘‘[] degree of freedom
is augmented, because in a federal system he can choose to live in the jurisdiction
that offers him the best set of institutional rules’’ (Mantzavinos 2010: 105). It is
thus, an interesting question to ask whether an increase in the choice set generally
also increases (or at least does not diminish) the utility of an individual. The
following conceptualisation illustrates our case.
Let us assume a unidimensional policy space with individual preferences
uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1]. An individual i = 1,…, n with a
preferred policy xi living in a country with a number of different jurisdictions
m = 1,…, M chooses the jurisdiction j = 1,…, m with a policy zjm closest to his own
preferences. The utility loss of this individual is defined as uij
m = -|xi–zj
m|, which is
the modulus of the difference between his preferred policy xi and the closest
1 See for this discussion Hausman and McPherson (1993, pp. 693ff.).
2 Even though Mantzavinos (2010) argues in the dimension of rights, his actual concept is in terms of
benefits, which is necessary in order to compare it with his concept of costs later on in the manuscript.
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available policy bundle zj
m, i.e., the utility loss an individual suffers from a deviation
of the actual from his/her preferred policy.
Given our assumptions the policy zj
m of a jurisdiction j equals the mean
preference in the jurisdiction. Hence, in a centralized country where m = 1 the
available policy bundle is z1
1 = 0.5. Any individual i with preferences xi = zj
m
suffers from a utility loss due to the deviation from its preferred policy. In the case
of m [1 individuals can choose among different policy bundles in the m non-
overlapping jurisdictions. An individual chooses the jurisdiction j out of a total
number of alternative jurisdictions m with the smallest deviation from its preferred
policy and hence, minimizes his utility loss.
The example in Fig. 1 illustrates the case: An individual k might have
preferences according to xk = 0.7. In a unitary state with m = j = 1 and z1
1 = 0.5
he suffers from a utility loss uk1
1 = -|xk–z1
1| = -|0.7–0.5| = -0.2. In a state with
two jurisdictions, m = 2, he can choose from zj
2 [ {0.25, 0.75}. Maximizing his
utility he will choose jurisdiction 2 and suffers from a utility loss of uk2
2 =
-|0.7–0.75| = -0.05. In the case of three jurisdictions, m = 3, individual k chooses
from zj
3 [ {0.16, 0.5, 0.83} and bears a minimal utility loss of uk3
3 = -0.133. If we
consider this sequence of utility losses given an increasing decentralization–i.e. an
increasing number of policy bundles to choose from–and optimal individual
decision making we observe a non-monotonic sequence.
It can be seen from Table 1 that monotonicity assumptions of a sequence of
utilities uij
m for intermediate values of xi for 0 \ xi \ 1 are violated. However, when
the number of jurisdictions goes to infinity (m ? ?) the sequences converge to the
same utility loss uij
m = 0. An extreme case would be that there are as many
jurisdictions as there are individuals and every individual has its own jurisdiction
with a policy according to his preferences.
Given that m is large enough, for each position of an individual xi, 0 \ xi \ 1, there
is a m where the step from m to m ? 1–i.e. an increase in individual liberty measured in
the dimension of rights as an increase in the choice set of alternative policy bundles–
reduces individual welfare.3 Thus, the monotonicity assumption is violated for all but
0 1 
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Fig. 1 Utility and diversity
3 Because the m individuals are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the political scale between ‘0’
and ‘1’, we can restrict ourselves to rational numbers. For every rational number k/m the increase from
m to m ? 1 will lead to an increase of the utility loss, because of
k
mþ1\
k
m \
kþ1
mþ1.
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the extreme values 0 and 1. Monotonicity holds, however, in this model for the average
distance of the individual position from the position of the closest available policy
bundle which is, given the assumptions above, equal to 1/4 m. Correspondingly, the
average utility increases monotonically as well. Thus, while an individual can expect
that her utility increases with an increasing number of governmental units, she cannot
be sure that this really happens in every single step.
A sufficient condition for monotonicity would be that an increase of elements in
the choice set leaves the existing elements unchanged. However, if, for example, an
existing unit is split into two new units, there are only two possibilities: Either, both
units keep to the same position the old unit had taken on, or both deviate from this
position. Only the latter situation would, however, really increase the choice set.
3 The problem of exit costs
According to Mantzavinos (2010, p. 107), diversity among jurisdictions ‘‘appears to
an individual as the difference between the new behavioural routines that he has to
get accustomed to in the new jurisdiction minus the behavioural routines of the
individual within his initial jurisdiction’’. Larger diversity leads, according to his
argument, to larger differences and, correspondingly, to larger adjustment costs.
These adjustment costs are what he calls exit costs in his model.
There are at least two problems with this argument: First, the major exit costs are the
costs connected with changing the location. These costs are missing in the model.
Second, there is no reason why the adjustment costs considered in his model should be
larger in a more decentralised system.4 Let us discuss this somewhat more detailed:
(1) Costs of mobility: Since the famous contribution of Tiebout (1956) it is
assumed in the theory of fiscal federalism that people choose the location
which has the combination of public expenditure (benefits) and taxes (costs)
which is closest to their preferences. This leads to a pareto-optimal allocation.
The actual allocation will be the further away from the optimal one the higher
mobility costs are. In a unitary state, the costs of mobility are extremely high,
perhaps even infinitely. If I am, for example, not satisfied with the French
system and if I am merely able to speak French, I have only very few
possibilities to move to another location, leaving aside the problem that the
right to move to another country is (at last outside the European Union) usually
severely restricted. But even if I have this possibility, I might not only have
high transportation costs but also all the costs connected with leaving my
social and institutional environment. On the other hand, if I am living in a
federal country like Germany and not satisfied, for example, with the situation
in Bremen, I can move to Lower-Saxony or to Hamburg which implies much
lower mobility costs. Thus, the smaller the federal units are, the lower are—
ceteris paribus—mobility costs. In a federal country with very small states
I can without problems even work in one and live in another state, which can
4 When discussing problems of mobility (Sect. 8), Mantzavinos (2010) takes only adjustment costs into
account but not the full costs of changing location.
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reduce mobility costs even further. Hence, high mobility costs due to e.g. a
unitary state without alternative options to the status quo impose potentially
high cost due to persisting deviations from individual preferences.
(2) Costs of adjustment: For the adjustment costs discussed by Mantzavinos
(2010) we have a similar situation as with respect to the benefits of
decentralisation discussed above. The structure of this argument also applies to
costs purely due to adjustment of behavioural routines and hence, we can
apply the same logic. In his discussion of the slope of the cost function, which
relies exclusively on adjustment costs of behavioural routines, Mantzavinos
(2010) argues that the cost function is taking a value of zero in a unitary state
and is then strictly increasing. Besides the arguments underpinning the positive
slope that will be questioned below, the justification for a value of zero in a
unitary state must be challenged. In contrast to Mantzavinos (2010) one could
easily argue that adjustment cost in a unitary state are very high (instead of
zero) since it would require an individual to move outside the unitary state in
order to reduce a persistend deviation from the preferred policy. Similarly, the
positive slope has to be questioned. An individual might be able to improve his
utility by moving to a jurisdiction closer to his preferences that only differs
with respect to some dimensions of the policy bundle while it is very similar
with respect to most other dimensions. Such an institutional environment is
more likely within a single decentralized country in which jurisdictions share
some common national legislation and institutions and differs with respect to
local characteristics. Comparing again the case of a unitary state such as
France with a more diverse state such as Germany we can easily imagine that
moving from Bremen to Hamburg has lower adjustment costs than moving
from Paris to Brussels or Quebec, which lie in different countries and differ
with respect to many institutional aspects. The more units there are, the closer
are the actual adjustment costs to the ones which arise if a governmental unit
takes on the optimal position of an individual. However, the convergence to
this point (which is reached at the latest if the number of governmental units
goes to infinity) is not monotonic, also not in absolute terms. Thus, we might
easily face a situation in which an increase in the number of governmental
units and, hence, also an increase in the diversity of jurisdictions, decreases
(and not increases) adjustment costs.
Taking these arguments together, exit costs might decrease (and, not, as
Mantzavinos 2010 states, increase) with an increasing number of governmental
units, but this decrease might not be monotonic.
4 Concluding remarks
Following the arguments above, increased decentralisation leads (on average, not
monotonolically) to higher benefits and lower mobility costs, while adjustment costs
converge to those that are unavoidable whenever individuals find their ‘optimal’
governmental unit. These are strong arguments in favour of federal structures. They
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do, however, not imply, that it is always better to have smaller governmental units.
The costs considered here are only part of total costs. As soon as the decentralisation
theorem of Oates (1972) is violated—i.e. as long as there exist (e.g. geographical)
spillovers which imply that those who pay for the provision of a (local) public good
are not identical with those who enjoy the benefits–there will also be valid
arguments in favour of centralisation. Thus, even if those costs which are considered
by Mantzavinos (2010) are hardly relevant there are other costs which imply that the
determination of the optimal degree of decentralisation is not an easy task.
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